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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

SHAWN P. STALLINGS,

Case No. 3:25-cv-00031-ART-CLB

Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.

NDOC, et al.,

Defendants.

8 Plaintiff Shawn P. Stallings brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C.
9 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while
10 incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections. (ECF No.
11 8.) On April 3, 2025, this Court ordered Stallings to file an amended complaint
12 within 90 days. (ECF No. 7.) The Court warned Stallings that the action could be
13 dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline. (*Id.* at 10.)
14 That deadline expired, and Stallings did not file an amended complaint, move for
15 an extension, or otherwise respond.

16 **I. DISCUSSION**

17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n
18 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where
19 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. *Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los*
20 *Angeles*, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based
21 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. *See Carey v.*
22 *King*, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to
23 comply with local rule requiring *pro se* plaintiffs to keep court apprised of
24 address); *Malone v. U.S. Postal Service*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)
25 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to
26 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the
27 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to
28 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy

1 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic
2 alternatives. *See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 460 F.3d 1217,
3 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th
4 Cir. 1987)).

5 The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this
6 litigation and the Court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of
7 dismissal of Stallings's claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants,
8 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the
9 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or
10 prosecuting an action. *See Anderson v. Air West*, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir.
11 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their
12 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic
14 alternatives can be used to correct the party's failure that brought about the
15 Court's need to consider dismissal. *See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier*, 191 F.3d 983,
16 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives *before*
17 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); *accord*
18 *Pagtalunan v. Galaza*, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
19 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted
20 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as
21 satisfying this element[,]” *i.e.*, like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled
22 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by
23 *Yourish*). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before
24 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful
25 alternatives.” *Henderson v. Duncan*, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986).
26 Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Stallings files
27 an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting
28 another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often

1 only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court's finite resources. The
2 circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is
3 no hint that Stallings needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive
4 the Court's screening order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful
5 alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal.

6 **II. CONCLUSION**

7 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that
8 they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is
9 dismissed without prejudice based on Stallings's failure to file an amended
10 complaint in compliance with this Court's April 3, 2025, order. The Clerk of
11 Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other
12 documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Stallings wishes to pursue
13 his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case.

14 It is further ordered that Stallings's application to proceed *in forma*
15 *pauperis* (ECF No. 1) is denied as moot.

17 DATED: July 23, 2025.

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21 ANNE R. TRAUM
22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE